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Economics 
The Effect of U.S. Import Tariff Reductions on Expanded Wage 
Inequality∗ 
HISAYA KITAOKA 
Franklin College 
ABSTRACT 
There is still considerable disagreement among researchers whether trade 
liberalization can explain the rising wage inequality. The wage inequality 
between skilled workers and unskilled workers expanded in the U.S. 
manufacturing industries during 1980 through 2000. Meanwhile, NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement) has provided us with the opportunity to 
observe the effect of significant tariff reduction during the same period. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the contribution of the reductions of U.S. 
import tariffs from NAFTA countries Canada and Mexico to that expanding 
wage inequality during 1980 through 2000. Based on the essential idea of Stolper 
and Samuelson (1941) and following the method of Haskel and Slaughter (2003), 
the relationship between product prices and U.S. tariff rates is estimated first and 
the effect of tariff-induced product prices on wage changes is then estimated. 
Based on a newly developed industrial classification code, this paper finds 
significant evidence that U.S. tariff reductions on both Canadian imports and 
Mexican imports expanded wage inequality between skilled workers and 
unskilled workers in U.S. manufacturing industries during the period considered. 
That is, a 1 percent reduction of U.S. tariffs on imports from Canada resulted in a 
mandated rise in the wage gap by 0.69 percent. A similar result was obtained for 
Mexican imports, in which a 1 percent reduction of U.S. tariffs on imports from 
Mexico resulted in a mandated rise in the wage gap by 0.57 percent. These 
results indicate that U.S. tariff reduction hurts unskilled workers in 
manufacturing industries, which does not match the result from Haskel and 
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Slaughter (2003), who found no significant evidence that tariff reductions 
widened wage inequality in the United States. 
KEY WORDS  Trade; Tariff; Import; NAFTA 
Increasing wage inequality between skilled workers and unskilled workers in U.S. 
manufacturing industries has attracted economists’ attention, and many explanations have been 
offered. One of the culprits most commonly cited is trade liberalization (Borjas and Ramey 1994; 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Revenga and Montenegro 1998; 
Hanson and Harrison 1999; Hanson 2003; Robertson 2004). However, there is still considerable 
disagreement among researchers whether trade liberalization can explain the rising wage gap 
(Katz and Murphy 1992; Lawrence et al. 1993; Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994; Harrigan 
and Balaban 1997; Haskel and Slaughter 1998; Katz and Autor 1999; Leamer 1999; Baldwin and 
Cain 2000; Harrigan 2000; Edwards and Lawrence 2010). 
This paper raises again a long-term argument: the effect of trade liberalization on 
increasing wage inequality between the two types of workers. One of the essential ideas to 
consider in the argument is that of Stolper and Samuelson (1941), who proposed that the effect of 
trade liberalization on wages occurs through changing product prices. This idea was applied by 
Haskel and Slaughter (2003), who used a weighted average of U.S. tariffs on imports from all 
countries to measure trade liberalization and analyzed the effect of tariff reduction-induced 
product price changes on wages between two types of workers in U.S. manufacturing industries 
during 1974 through 1988. Their results, however, have shown no significant evidence that U.S. 
tariff reductions mandated a rise in wage inequality. This paper, using a newly developed 
industrial classification code applied to a different set of tariff data from a different time period 
than that considered by Haskel and Slaughter (2003), examines Stolper and Samuelson (1941) 
and finds a different result from Haskel and Slaughter (2003). U.S. tariffs on imports from 
countries in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada and Mexico, in the 
period of 1980 through 2000 are considered in this paper. U.S. tariff rates were generally 
declining after 1980 especially, and NAFTA has provided us with an opportunity to observe the 
effect of U.S. tariff reductions. Meanwhile, it can be seen that the wage gap between skilled 
workers and unskilled workers in U.S. manufacturing industries has widened since the early 
1980s. This paper examines whether the reduction of U.S. import tariffs from Canada and 
Mexico, working through product prices, raises expanding wage inequality between two types of 
workers in U.S. manufacturing industries from 1980 through 2000.  
The analysis is conducted by applying the method (mandated wage methodology with the 
two-stage procedure1) of Haskel and Slaughter (2003); that is, the relationship between product 
prices and U.S. tariffs and other causal variables are estimated first. This allows the portion of 
product price changes due to the change in U.S. tariffs to be estimated. Next, the change in wages 
affected by the adjustment in tariff-induced product prices is estimated. This analysis also uses all 
U.S. manufacturing industries described by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 72 
for 1980 through 1986, four-digit SIC 87 for 1987 through 1996, and six-digit North American 
Industrial Classification System (NAICS) for 1997 through 2000.  
The data consist of the U.S. import variables from all countries and U.S. industrial 
variables from 1980 through 2000, all of which are aggregated into 100 industries for 
concordance, which is newly developed by the author. 
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This paper finds that a 1 percent reduction of U.S. tariffs on imports from Canada, 
working through product price change (by –0.008 percent) mandated a fall in the wage for 
unskilled workers by 0.6 percent and a rise in the wage for skilled workers by 0.09 percent, 
resulting in a mandated rise in the wage gap by 0.69 percent. A similar result was obtained for 
U.S. tariff reductions on imports from Mexico, in which a 1 percent reduction of U.S. tariffs on 
imports from Mexico, working through product price change (by –0.009 percent), mandated a fall 
in the wage for unskilled workers by 0.58 percent and a rise in the wage for skilled workers by 
0.01 percent, resulting in a mandated rise in the wage gap by 0.57 percent. These results indicate 
magnification effect. Hence, unlike Haskel and Slaughter (2003), this research concludes that 
U.S. tariff reductions on both Canadian imports and Mexican imports have a significant effect on 
expanding wage inequality between skilled workers and unskilled workers in U.S. manufacturing 
industries during the period considered. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is discussed in the 
following section. Then the data are described, including a summary of the tariff and wage data, 
and specifications. Results are then given, and finally, the paper is concluded with some 
recommendations for future research. 
MODEL 
The theory of international trade (Heckscher-Ohlin model) under the traditional 
assumption is stated in terms of an economy with no trade barriers for which domestic product 
prices are set in world markets. According to Haskel and Slaughter, “Trade barriers drive a wedge 
between domestic prices and world prices” (2003:632). Thus, the reduction of tariff rates as one 
of the trade barriers for trade liberalization is focused on and the effect of product price changes 
mandated by U.S. tariff reductions on wages for skilled workers and unskilled workers is 
examined. 
To implement this, the mandated wage methodology with the two-stage procedure of 
Haskel and Slaughter (2003) is applied. Let 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … … … , 𝐼𝐼  be a factor of production and 
𝑗𝑗 = 1, … … … , 𝐽𝐽 be an industry. Also, suppose there is a list of K  variables that affect product 
prices (𝑘𝑘 = 1, … … … ,𝐾𝐾). This list includes tariff rates as well as other causal variables such as 
transportation costs, U.S. output share, exchange rate, capital/labor ratio, and total factor 
productivity (TFP). Let the time period be 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … … … ,𝑇𝑇. 𝑝𝑝 is (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 1 vector of domestic 
product prices. Let 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗  be the 𝑇𝑇 x 𝐾𝐾 matrix consisting of elements 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  (value of the 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡ℎ  causal 
variable for sector 𝑗𝑗  at time 𝑡𝑡). So, 𝑍𝑍 = (𝑍𝑍1 ,𝑍𝑍2, … … … ,𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 )𝑇𝑇 , a (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 𝐾𝐾  matrix of causal 
variables, which are assumed to drive product price changes. Let 𝛼𝛼, a parameter to be estimated 
with 𝐾𝐾 x 1 matrix, be the effect of a 1 percent change in causal variable 𝑍𝑍 on 𝑝𝑝. 
For a first-stage regression, domestic product prices on tariff rates and other causal 
variables, 𝑍𝑍 , are regressed and the relationship between product prices and tariff rates is 
estimated. This allows how much the tariff rates affect product prices to be calculated.  
 log⁡(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝛼𝛼 + 𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀 first-stage regression (1) 
Here, 𝜀𝜀 is an error term with (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 1 vector. Estimated coefficients 𝛼𝛼� show how much causal 
variables affect product prices. 𝛼𝛼� does not vary by industry. This assumes the same pass-through 
rate from tariff to product prices across all industries; that is, all industries are treated identically. 
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To allow heterogeneity among industries, industry dummy variables, 𝐷𝐷, are included in equation 
(1). 𝐷𝐷 is a (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 𝐾𝐾 diagonal matrix with 𝑇𝑇 x 1 column of ones in each diagonal position. 𝛿𝛿 is 
an estimated coefficient of 𝐷𝐷 with 𝐾𝐾 x 1 vector. 
For a second-stage regression, the contribution to 𝑝𝑝  of each causal variable, 𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝛼𝛼� 
obtained from the first-stage regression (1) is regressed on the factor share 𝜃𝜃 to estimate the 
change in factor prices affected by the tariff rates-induced product prices:  
 𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝛼𝛼� = 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑒𝑒 second-stage regression (2) 
where 𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝛼𝛼� is (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 1 vector, 𝜃𝜃 is (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 𝐼𝐼 matrix of factor share among the cost, 𝛽𝛽 is a 
parameter to be estimated with 𝐼𝐼 x 1 vector, and 𝑒𝑒 is a (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 1 vector of error terms. 𝐷𝐷, dummy 
variable with (𝐽𝐽 x 𝑇𝑇) x 𝐾𝐾 diagonal matrix, is included in equation (2) for the same reason as in 
equation (1). 𝛾𝛾 is an estimated coefficient of 𝐷𝐷 with 𝐾𝐾 x 1 vector. The second-stage regression 
yields ?̂?𝛽 (estimates of 𝛽𝛽), the change in factor prices mandated by each causal variable working 
through 𝑝𝑝. That is, I have an estimate of the effect on the change in factor prices of product 
prices, which are mandated by the reduction of tariff rates. Because ?̂?𝛽𝑆𝑆 is the change in the wage 
for skilled workers and ?̂?𝛽𝑈𝑈  is the change in the wage for unskilled workers, both of which result 
from a 1 percent change in tariff rates, the difference between ?̂?𝛽𝑆𝑆  and ?̂?𝛽𝑆𝑆  tells us how the change 
in tariff rates affects the wage gap. 
The dependent variable in the second-stage regression (2) is generated from estimates of 
the first-stage regression. While the estimated coefficient for the second-stage regression is still 
consistent (Murphy and Topel 1985), the standard error of the second-stage coefficient estimates 
needs to be corrected to account for the additional variance of the first-stage estimation. I have 
followed the procedure proposed by Dumont et al. (2005)2 to correct the variance of the second-
stage regression coefficient estimates. That is, 
 First-stage regression: log⁡(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝛼𝛼 + 𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀 (3) 
 Second-stage regression: 𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝛼𝛼� = 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑒𝑒 (4) 
 Then,3 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉�?̂?𝛽� = 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2(𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃)−1 + (𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃)−1𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃)−1    
  = (𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃)−1[𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃](𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝜃𝜃)−1 
 where 𝑍𝑍 = 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2(𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍)−1.  
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 can be estimated by 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛−𝑣𝑣 , where 𝑢𝑢 is estimated residual from the second-stage stage 
regression, 𝑣𝑣 is number of columns of 𝜃𝜃 (𝑣𝑣 =3 if I use three factors of production), and 𝑛𝑛  is 
number of observations. 
𝑍𝑍 is estimated by 𝑍𝑍�, covariance matrix of 𝛼𝛼�, which is unbiased estimator of 𝑍𝑍 obtained 
from the first-stage regression. 
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DATA AND SPECIFICATIONS 
U.S. industry data and import data for 1980 through 2000 are used. U.S. industrial data 
are from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) with four-digit 1972 SIC 72 code for 1980 
through 1986, ASM with four-digit 1987 SIC 87 code for 1987 through 1996, and ASM with six-
digit NAICS code for 1997 through 2000. ASM is provided by U.S. Census Bureau. Import data 
are available from Robert C. Feenstra (1996) based on the Tariff Schedule of the United States 
Annotated (TSUSA) classification code for 1980 through 1988 and from Feenstra, Romalis, and 
Schott (2002) based on 10-digit Harmonized Tariff System (HTS 10) code for 1989 through 
2000. All industrial and import data are aggregated into 100 industries for concordance because 
(1) numbers of industrial classification codes used in the industrial data and those in import data 
are different: TSUSA includes 27,000 industries, HTS 10 has about 24,000, SIC72 has 450, 
SIC87 has 460, and NAICS has 473 and (2) no classification code matches another classification 
code on a one-to-one basis. One specific classification code was therefore selected to organize the 
entire data set for this research. For example, industry classification code number 2048 in SIC 87 
corresponds to both 311119 and 311611 in NAICS, according to the concordance between SIC 87 
and NAICS. To solve this problem, two industries (311119 + 311611) in NAICS are aggregated 
to correspond to 2048 in SIC 87 so we have a one-to-one relationship between two different 
classification codes (SIC 87 and NAICS in this case). Repeating this procedure, a unique 
industrial classification code4 has been created that has consistent convertibility with all six 
classification codes (TSUSA, HTS 10, SIC 72, SIC 87, and NAICS) and has 100 industrial 
classification codes. All nominal variables are converted to 1982–1984 dollars using consumer 
price index (CPI) for all urban consumers (CPI-U). 
There are missing observations among both the industry data and the import data. For 
industrial data, most of them occur in capital expenditures from 1980 through 1999. Using the 2-
digit and 3-digit SIC code and this unique code, I made up values for the missing observations. In 
case the values could not be made up, however, they were left blank.5 For import data, missing 
values were also left blank. 
Before a specification is described, tariff data and wage data are summarized as below. 
The tariff rate for a given commodity is calculated as total duties collected as a share of the total 
customs value of imports for consumption. Here, to get a general picture of the changing tariff 
climate, average tariff rates are presented. U.S. tariffs on imports were generally declining from 
1980 through 2000, as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the U.S. tariff rate on imports from 
Canada, imports from Mexico, and a weighted average of U.S. tariffs on imports from all 
countries (worldwide). The decline of tariff rates with Canada accelerated sharply with the U.S.–
Canada FTA in 1988, and the tariff rates on imports from Mexico declined sharply with the U.S.–
Mexico FTA in 1994. In both cases, the tariff rates became close to 0 percent around 2000 and 
have remained there since then. These sharp declines of tariff rates after the beginning of the 
FTAs can be seen more clearly in Table 1. Meanwhile, the weighted average of U.S. tariff on 
imports from all countries (worldwide) declined from about 5 percent to about 2 percent in 2000 
and has remained there since then. 
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Note: World shows weighted average of U.S. tariffs on imports from all countries. 
Sources: Feenstra (1996) for 1980–1988; Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) for 1989–2000. 
See text for details of construction of tariff rate. All calculations are by the author. 
Figure 1. U.S. Tariffs on Canada and Mexico and Worldwide, 1980–2000 
Wage data for both skilled workers and unskilled workers are from the ASM from 1980 
through 2000. Data for production workers in the ASM are used to measure unskilled workers, 
and data for non-production workers (total workers minus production workers) in the ASM are 
used to measure skilled workers. All nominal wages are converted to 1982–1984 dollars using 
CPI-U.  
Overall movement of real wages for skilled and unskilled workers in U.S. manufacturing 
industries from 1980 through 2000 is summarized in Figure 2. There was generally an upward 
trend since the early 1980s for real wages of skilled workers, while no general trend could be seen 
for unskilled workers. From 1980 to 2000, the average real wage of skilled workers increased by 
about 18.0 percent, while the average real wage of unskilled workers increased by only 1.7 
percent, resulting in an increase in a relative wage of skilled workers to unskilled workers, as seen 
in Figure 3. The relative wage of skilled workers to unskilled workers is calculated as real wage 
for skilled workers as a share of real wage for unskilled workers.  
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Table 1. Change of U.S. Tariffs in Relation to Free Trade Agreements 
 U.S.–Canadaa U.S.–Mexicoa 
  Average  Average 
  %change annual change %change annual change 
1980–2000 –97.3% –16.5% –96.1% –15.0% 
     
 Pre FTA –30.8% –5.1% –68.7% –5.9% 
 (1980–1987) (1980–1987) (1980–1993) (1980–1993) 
 Post FTA –96.1% –23.7% –78.20 –14.13% 
 (1988–2000) (1988–2000) (1994–2000) (1994–2000) 
     
  U.S.–Worldb   
  Average   
  %change annual change   
1980–2000  –62.0% –4.7%   
 (1980–2000) (1980–2000)   
Notes:  a The U.S.–Canada FTA was in effect in 1988, and the U.S.–Mexico FTA was in effect in 1994. 
 b Weighted average of U.S. tariff on imports from all countries in the world. 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Manufacturing for 1980–2000.  
Notes: See the text for construction of variables. All calculations are by the author. 
Figure 2. U.S. Real Wage per Worker, 1980–2000 
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Source: Annual Survey of Manufacturing for 1980–2000.  
Notes: See the text for construction of variables. All calculations are by the author. 
Figure 3. Relative Wage of Skilled to Unskilled Workers, 1980–2000 
For the modeling of the specification of the first-stage regression, assume that 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  (U.S. 
domestic product prices for industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡) depends on trade barriers, U.S. import variables, 
and U.S. industrial variables. U.S. tariffs and transportation costs are used for trade barriers; the 
exchange rate between U.S. currency and foreign currencies are used for the import variable; and 
TFP, U.S. output share, and the capital-labor ratio are used for U.S. industrial variables. Table 2 
summarizes statistics (mean and standard deviation) for all variables. 
Then, the estimating equation (first-stage regression) for explaining 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is given by: log⁡(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝛼1 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼2 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛼𝛼3 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  
  +𝛼𝛼5 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7 ∙ 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  
  +𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗  
Here, 𝑗𝑗 is the industry and has 100 industries. 𝑡𝑡 is the year from 1980 to 2000. Superscript 𝑐𝑐 
represents a country, Canada or Mexico. 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  represents product prices for industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡. 
Value-added prices in each industry are used following Haskel and Slaughter (2003). 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  is 
the U.S. tariff rate on imports from country 𝑐𝑐 for industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡. 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  is calculated as 
total duties collected as a share of total customs value of imports for consumption.6 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  is 
the U.S. tariff rate on imports from the rest of the world (all countries except country 𝑐𝑐 ) for 
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industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡. 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  and 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  are transportation costs for import of industry 𝑗𝑗 at 
time 𝑡𝑡  from country 𝑐𝑐 and from the rest of the world (all countries except 𝑐𝑐 ). 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  and 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  are calculated as import charges7 as a share of total customs value of imports for 
consumption. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is total factor productivity8 for industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡. 𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is the 
share of U.S. output for industry 𝑗𝑗 in total manufacturing industry at time 𝑡𝑡. 𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is 
calculated by U.S. output as a share of total manufacturing industry output. U.S. outputs for 
industry 𝑗𝑗 are represented by the amount of value added for industry 𝑗𝑗, while total manufacturing 
industry outputs are by amount of total value of shipments in manufacturing industries. 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  
is the capital-labor ratio for industry 𝑗𝑗. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  is the exchange rate for the trade-weighted 
exchange index with major currencies areas such as Euro area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden from the Economic Data-Fred® by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis. 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗  represents industry dummy variables. A constant term is not included in the 
specification, to avoid a dummy variable trap. Estimated 𝛼𝛼�1  shows how much change in U.S. 
tariffs on imports from 𝑐𝑐 affects the change in domestic product prices.  
Table 2. Summary Statistics for All Variables 
 Mean 
  
Product prices (log p) 7.32 
 (1.20) 
Output share (outshare) 49.97 
 (13.70) 
TFP (TFP) 1.47 
 (0.65) 
K/L ratio (KLratio) 25.16 
 (21.82) 
Exchange rate (ExRateTWEI) 99.78 
 (13.84) 
U.S. tariff rates on Canadian imports (TariffCanada) 2.47 
 (3.44) 
Transportation costs on Canadian imports (TransCanada) 1.66 
 (2.60) 
U.S. tariff rates on Mexican goods (TariffMexico) 2.09 
 (3.53) 
Transportation costs on Mexican goods (TransMexico) 2.34 
 (4.16) 
Factor share for skilled workers 0.07 
 (0.04) 
Factor share for unskilled workers 0.12 
 (0.06) 
Factor share for capital 0.04 
 (0.03) 
Standard deviation in ( ).  
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For the second-stage regression, three factors of production—unskilled workers, skilled 
workers, and rental price of capital—are included. Data for production workers in the ASM are 
used for unskilled workers, and data for non-production workers (total workers minus production 
workers) in the ASM are used for skilled workers.9 New capital expenditures and used capital 
expenditures are summed to calculate total capital expenditure. The regressand of second-stage 
regression comes from the first-stage regression. 𝛼𝛼�1 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , which is computed in the first-
stage regression, is the regressand of second-stage regression. Next, 𝛼𝛼�1 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  is regressed on 
the factor shares for skilled workers (𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ), unskilled workers (𝜃𝜃𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ), and rental price of capital 
(𝜃𝜃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ). That is, the specification of second-stage regression is 
𝛼𝛼�1 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 ∙ 𝜃𝜃𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉 ∙ 𝜃𝜃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is cost share for skilled workers in industry 𝑗𝑗  at time 𝑡𝑡 , 𝜃𝜃𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is cost share for unskilled 
workers in industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝜃𝜃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is cost share for capital in industry 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡. Each of 
these factors is constructed as a share of the total value of shipment, following Haskel and 
Slaughter (2003). Estimated coefficients ?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇  and ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢  are changes in wages for skilled workers and 
unskilled workers mandated by change in tariffs, working through change of product prices. 
Taking the difference between ?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇  and ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢  gives an estimate of how the reduction of the tariff 
changes the wage gap. 
RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of the regression that have been conducted, using the 
newly developed unique industrial classification code, for the effect of reductions of U.S. tariffs 
on wages for skilled workers and unskilled workers for 1980 through 2000. Consider the first-
stage regression (Table 3) showing the correlation between product price and U.S. tariffs. 
The left column of Table 3 shows the effect of U.S. tariffs on imports from Canada on 
product price. It shows that if the tariff rate changes by 1 percent, product price ( pˆ ) changes by 
about –0.008 percent. Product prices are negatively correlated with the U.S. tariff on Canadian 
imports. This correlation is statistically significantly different from zero. The trade barrier 
variable 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  has a statistically significant effect on product prices, whereas other trade 
barrier variables (𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  ,𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ) have statistically insignificant effects on product prices. 
The import variable, log tweitExrate∆ , and domestic industrial variables ( 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 , 
𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ) show statistically significant effects on change in product prices at 
the 1 percent level. The right column showing the effect on product price of U.S. tariffs on 
imports from Mexico is read in the same manner. It shows that if the tariff rate changes by 1 
percent, product price ( pˆ ) changes by about –0.009 percent. The same results for other variables 
were obtained for Mexican imports. 
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Table 3. First-stage Regression Results 
 
Regression Results (1st Stage) 
   
 
(Dependent Variable: log P) 
 
c is Canada c is Mexico 
Tariffc –0.0076*** –0.0088*** 
 
(5.94) (6.34) 
Transc 0.0021 –0.0005 
 
(1.46) (0.62) 
TariffRow –0.0063*** –0.0077*** 
 
(4.70) (5.77) 
TransRow –0.0006 –0.0002 
 
(0.77) (0.14) 
TFP –0.6161*** –0.7508*** 
 
(24.62) (29.67) 
Outshare 0.0494*** 0.0544*** 
 
(43.63) (50.22) 
KLratio 0.0007*** 0.0012*** 
 
(3.89) (7.01) 
ExRateTwei –0.0009*** –0.0010*** 
 
(3.85) (4.98) 
R-sq. 0.9993 0.9995 
Obs. 1804 1728 
(XXX) shows absolute t-statistics. 
*** Shows significance at 1% level. 
To estimate wage changes mandated by U.S. tariffs working through product price 
changes, the second-stage regressions need to be estimated (Table 4). 
Consider first the left column in Table 4, which shows the effect on the wage gap of 
product prices mandated by the change in U.S. tariff on imports from Canada. It indicates that a 1 
percent reduction of tariff, working through product prices, mandated a rise in the wage for 
skilled workers (?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇) by 0.09 percent and mandated a fall in the wage for unskilled workers (?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢 ) 
by 0.60 percent, resulting in a mandated rise in the wage gap (?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇 > ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢) by 0.69 percent. These 
results, except the rise in the wage for skilled workers, are statistically significantly different from 
zero. A similar result is obtained when the effect on the wage gap of product prices mandated by 
the U.S. tariff on Mexican imports is estimated (right column). A 1 percent reduction of tariff 
mandated a rise in the wage for skilled workers (?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇) by 0.08 percent and mandated a fall in the 
wage for unskilled workers (?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢 ) by 0.58 percent, resulting in a mandated rise in the wage gap 
(?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇 > ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢) by 0.57 percent. 
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Table 4. Second-stage Regression Results 
  Regression Results (2nd Stage) 
    
 (Dependent variable: log P induced by tariff rate) 
  
 U.S.–Canada U.S.–Mexico  
Wage (Skilled Workers): ?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇  0.085 0.008  
 (0.39) (0.04)  
Wages (Unskilled Workers): ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢  –0.600*** –0.582***  
 (2.68) (3.27)  
Rental Price of Capital 0.079 0.1093  
 (0.56) (0.62)  
      R-sq. 0.725 0.818  
      Obs. 1804 1728  
Wage gap     
      ?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇  – ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢  0.685* 0.573*  
 (1.85) (1.87)  
 Expand Expand  
(xxxx) shows absolute t-statistics. 
* significant at 10% level  
*** significant at 1% level 
This paper finds significant evidence that U.S. tariff reductions on both Canadian imports 
and Mexican imports expanded wage inequality between skilled workers and unskilled workers in 
U.S. manufacturing industries from 1980 through 2000. This finding demonstrates that U.S. tariff 
reductions on Canadian imports and Mexican imports had statistically significant effects on the 
mandated change in wage gap in U.S. manufacturing industries during the period considered. The 
result shows a magnification effect; that is, a 1 percent change of tariff rate on Canadian imports 
caused +0.08 percent change of wage for skilled workers, –0.008 percent change of product price, 
and –0.6 percent change of wage for unskilled workers (?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇  >  ?̂?𝑝  >  ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢  ). The same observation 
can be seen for Mexican imports; that is, a 1 percent change of tariff rate on Mexican imports 
caused +0.008 percent change of wage for skilled workers, –0.009 percent change of product 
price, and –0.58 percent change of wage for unskilled workers (?̂?𝛽𝑇𝑇  >  ?̂?𝑝  >  ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢  ). Because of 
tariff reduction, change of product price has a magnified effect on factor prices. In other words, 
the relative price of unskilled worker-intensive products to skilled worker-intensive products 
lowers because of tariff reduction and causes reduction in the wage of unskilled workers and 
increase in the wage of skilled workers. 
Various model specifications are estimated to test the robustness of the results in Tables 3 
and 4 in a number of ways. First, a lagged effect between tariff changes and wages is considered. 
Second, causal variables in the first-stage regression are changed in three ways. The first 
specification has only a tariff variable as causal variable, the second one has only trade barrier 
variables (tariff and transportation cost variables), and the third one adds import price variable10 
to the specifications that are conducted. Third, the effect of a weighted average of U.S. tariff cuts 
on goods from all countries on wages for both types of workers from 1980 to 2000 is tested. 
Fourth, another combined effect of the U.S. tariff on Canada and Mexico on wages for both types 
of workers is tested. These tests indicate that the results do not change. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper, based on the essential idea of Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and following 
the mandated wage methodology with two-stage procedure of Haskel and Slaughter (2003), 
examined whether the reduction of U.S. tariffs, working through product prices, raised the wage 
gap between skilled workers and unskilled workers in U.S. manufacturing industries from 1980 
through 2000. The effect of U.S. tariff reductions on imports from Canada and Mexico on wages 
for both types of workers was estimated, using the newly developed unique industrial 
classification code, and verified by various model specifications in a number of ways. 
This research found that U.S. tariff reductions on Canadian imports and Mexican imports 
had a statistically significant effect on mandated change in wage gap in U.S. manufacturing 
industries from 1980 through 2000. Thus, this paper found significant evidence that U.S. tariff 
reductions expanded wage inequality between skilled workers and unskilled workers in U.S. 
manufacturing industries during the period considered. These results showed a magnification 
effect; that is, the effect of international trade (tariff reduction) on factor prices was larger than 
the effect on product prices. The result indicated that the U.S. tariff reduction hurts unskilled 
workers in U.S. manufacturing industries. 
This finding does not match the result from Haskel and Slaughter (2003), who found no 
significant evidence that tariff reductions widened wage inequality in the United States. There are 
some differences between Haskel and Slaughter (2003) and this paper: (1) Haskel and Slaughter 
used a weighted average of U.S. tariffs on imports from all countries, whereas this paper focused 
on NAFTA countries and used U.S. tariffs on Canadian imports and Mexican imports; (2) Haskel 
and Slaughter considered the period between 1974 and 1988, but this paper examined the 1980 
through 2000 so the period after FTA could be included in the analysis, which brings large tariff 
reduction; and (3) Haskel and Slaughter used Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for correction of 
variance of estimated coefficient in the second-stage regression, whereas this study used the 
method of Dumont et al. (2005) so positive variance was guaranteed. 
The results of this paper have provided some ideas for future work. First, similar tariff 
reductions on imports from the United States have been implemented in both Mexico and 
Canada. It will be worth conducting the same analysis for the relationship between reduction of 
tariffs and wage inequality in these two countries using the same method. Second, the United 
States has been reducing tariff rates on imports from many countries and regions other than 
NAFTA countries. It would be interesting to investigate the effect of those tariff reductions on 
wage inequality in the United States. Third, it will be interesting to see the same analysis for each 
state of the United States instead of the whole country. Fourth, it will be interesting to look at 
another channel other than the tariff-product price channel, such as the tariff-technological 
channel. Tariff reduction may cause technological change, which may decrease the relative 
demand for low-skill workers in the United States and thus their relative wages. Fifth, the effects 
of U.S. tariffs on Canadian wages and Mexican wages can be examined as well. For example, 
U.S.–Mexico trade is small in volume in terms of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) but is not 
small from the Mexican point of view. Thus, the U.S. tariff reductions may affect Mexican 
wages. 
Finally, this paper examined the expanding wage inequality from the U.S. tariff reduction 
point of view. Although several researchers have previously investigated the effect of U.S. tariff 
reductions on the increasing wage inequality, this problem still needs to be considered by 
including other factors.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. First proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999). 
2. Dumont et al. (2005) improved the correction procedure developed first by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997). 
3. See Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Dumont et al. (2005) for this result. 
4. More detailed information on the author’s unique industrial code is available on request. 
5. The author calculated the amount of missing values, which account for about 0.18 percent of 
total capital expenditure. This level is not crucial. 
6. The custom value for 1989 through 2000 has two types—imports for consumption and 
general imports—whereas the custom value for 1980 through 1988 has only one type, 
imports for consumption. The author has therefore used “custom value, imports for 
consumption” for this analysis for consistent point of view. 
7. Import charge is not listed in Feenstra (1996) for 1980 through 1988. It has therefore been 
constructed here by calculating [(CIF value) – (custom value)]. Please note that there are 
some observations reporting CIF value smaller than the custom value, in which case 
transportation costs are set equal to zero. Also, CIF value is not reported in Feenstra et al. 
(2002) for the period of 1989 through 2000, in which case, CIF value is constructed as 
[(custom value, imports for consumption) + (import charge)]. 
8. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗  is defined by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇  𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡  𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒  𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉  𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  𝑗𝑗(𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡  𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒  𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉  𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  𝑗𝑗 )𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡  𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇  𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉  𝑖𝑖) , following 
Leamer (1998). 
9. There are many arguments about the classifications for skilled and unskilled workers (Leamer 
1994). A category of production workers in the ASM is applied to unskilled workers.  
10. It is not proper that import price variable is an explanatory variable in the first-stage 
regression, because the import price variable and tariff variable are closely correlated, so the 
import price variable was not included in the main analysis. 
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